Daodao assigns voting power through staked tokens or approved member lists

Daodao assigns voting power through staked governance tokens or an approved membership list, depending on the voting module. These participation models govern membership in a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). Token staking registers voting power; a member-based DAO adds addresses through a passed and executed proposal. Both models feed membership weights into proposal decisions, while the core contract holds the treasury. Admission, weight changes, and leaving follow different rules in each model. A proposal's snapshot determines which voting power applies to that vote.

Member approval takes effect when the proposal executes

Adding an address to a member-based DAO requires a proposal containing the Manage Members action. That action can add a member and assign the voting weight that the DAO approves. The proposal uses the electorate that existed when it was created. A proposed addition does not immediately give its intended recipient a vote on their own admission. The proposal must pass under the DAO's configured voting rules, and execution must apply the membership change.

The interface groups Manage Members under DAO Governance . Its add/update and remove fields distinguish adding an address or changing its weight from removing it.

The voting module connects membership to proposal decisions

The voting power module supplies an address's weight independently of the proposal module's ballot format. A member list records assigned weights; a staking-based module derives power from registered governance tokens. Proposal modules use that power when processing decisions. Membership gives an address influence over treasury governance, while the core contract continues holding its assets. Proposal submission and execution permissions remain separate settings.

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Staked and available tokens serve different purposes

In a staked-token DAO, the amount registered for voting determines participation; the unstaked balance remains available for uses outside voting.

Tokens registered for voting

Only the DAO's designated governance tokens that an address has staked contribute to voting power in this model. Tokens held unstaked in the wallet do not count. Increasing stake changes the power available for later proposals without requiring a proposal to add the address to a member list. The staking balance supplies that power to the proposal module.

Tokens kept available

Proposal deposits may require unstaked tokens. If that deposit uses the governance token, staking all of it can leave no available balance for the deposit. An unstaking duration can also postpone access to tokens that leave the voting stake. The decision to stake therefore involves both voting influence and token availability. Neither a deposit requirement nor a waiting period is universal across DAOs.

Member weights determine influence within the approved list

The member-management interface uses positive whole-number voting weights for approved addresses, allowing equal or unequal influence within the list.

Equal member weights

With equal weights, every listed address contributes the same amount of voting power. Adding another address at that weight expands total voting power and reduces each existing address's relative share for future proposals. Equality concerns assigned voting power; the DAO's voting rules still determine whether a decision passes. Counting addresses describes the distribution only while their weights remain equal.

Unequal member weights

With unequal weights, counting addresses no longer describes influence accurately. An address's share equals its assigned weight divided by the sum of all member weights. Manage Members can update weights for existing addresses, as well as add new ones. A weight adjustment changes governance influence without removing the address from the list.

Each proposal retains its own membership snapshot

Proposal creation fixes the voting distribution used for that decision. An address that joins later cannot gain eligibility for an existing proposal simply by appearing in the current membership list. Additional tokens staked after a proposal begins likewise do not rewrite its original voting distribution. Current membership and eligibility for an existing vote can therefore differ.

Removing an address from a member-based DAO does not remove its right to vote on proposals created during its membership.

Participation and execution permissions grant different powers

Proposal submission and execution are separate permissions from voting power. The submission policy can limit proposals to members or allow anyone to submit. The Only members execute setting separately controls who may execute passed proposals. Open submission gives non-members a way to present a decision; it does not assign them voting weight. Permission to execute applies to actions that the proposal has already approved.

Submission and voting settings can differ between single-choice and multiple-choice proposal modules. Changing those settings requires governance through the relevant configuration actions. The membership model and proposal permissions operate together; parent administration adds another authority when the DAO is a SubDAO.

Leaving follows either unstaking or member removal

Leaving a staked-token DAO involves withdrawing voting stake. Leaving a member-based DAO requires governance to remove the address.

Ending staked-token participation

Leaving this staking-based membership model requires unstaking the entire governance-token stake. When the DAO imposes an unstaking duration, a pending balance remains unavailable until that period ends. In the delayed-claim workflow, users must approve a claim transaction in their wallet after the wait. The tokens become available when that transaction succeeds. Starting unstaking does not immediately make those delayed tokens transferable.

Ending listed membership

A member cannot independently remove their address from the approved list. The Manage Members action supports removals, which take effect through a passed and executed proposal. Removal updates the governance list; it does not itself distribute treasury assets. Membership status and the DAO's asset ownership remain separate contract concerns.

Parent administration and migration can change member control

A SubDAO's parent can execute actions on its behalf while the parent remains its administrator. This authority includes spending from the SubDAO's treasury and managing its members. A local member list therefore operates within that wider control relationship. Moving membership to a new DAO raises a different issue: voting power can decline in the original DAO as people migrate. That decline can weaken its ability to reject malicious proposals, especially when governance tokens are purchasable. A migration plan should specify voting-power transfer and safeguards for the original DAO throughout the transition.

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